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Consider exchange economies in which preferences are continu-
ous, convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Wal-
rasian correspondence is not Nash implementable: Maskin monotonic-
ity (Maskin, 1999) is violated for Walrasian allocations on the bound-
ary of the feasible set. We derive an impossibility result showing that
the Walrasian correspondence is in fact not implementable in any of
the solution concepts considered in the implementation literature.
Next, imposing an additional domain restriction, we construct a
sequential mechanism that doubly implements the Walrasian corre-
spondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilib-
rium. The mechanism is based on price-allocation announcements,
and it ￿ts the very description of Walrasian equilibrium. We thus
take care of the boundary problem that was prominent in the Nash
implementation literature.
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double implementation, subgame perfect equilibrium, strong subgame perfect
equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The question of the implementation of the Walrasian correspondence has re-
ceived much attention over the past decades. While the Walrasian correspon-
dence satis￿es desirable requirements ￿ e.g. e¢ ciency, individual rationality￿
its strategic properties are much less appealing. Hurwicz (1972) shows that
agents would not ￿nd it in their interest to honestly report their preferences or
demand functions to the so-called auctioneer: the Walrasian correspondence
is not strategy-proof. The news is not better even if agents have complete
information about one another and behave according to the Nash equilib-
rium criterion. Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1995) show that Maskin
monotonicity (Maskin, 1999; ￿rst version dated 1977), a necessary condition
for implementation of a social choice correspondence (henceforth, SCC) in
Nash equilibrium, is violated by the Walrasian correspondence for allocations
that are at the boundary of the feasible set. The Walrasian correspondence
is badly behaved because it also depends on the shape of preferences outside
of the feasible set. This is what generates the so-called boundary problem.
Two early papers in the literature on Nash implementation of the Wal-
rasian correspondence, Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980), go around the
violation of Maskin monotonicity by constructing mechanisms in which allo-
cations obtained o⁄the equilibrium path may award unfeasible bundles with
negative quantities to some agents.1
Giraud and Rochon (2001) construct an alternative mechanism that re-
spects feasibility but rules out Walrasian allocations on the boundary. Al-
ternatively, the literature also paid attention to the Nash implementation of
the constrained Walrasian correspondence ￿ see for instance Postlewaite and
Wettstein (1989), Dutta,Sen and Vohra (1995), Tian (1992, 2000), or Sot-
skov (2003).2 Consistent with the notion of Walrasian equilibrium, in each of
these papers, strategy sets include announcements of allocations and prices.
In a di⁄erent literature, papers on non-cooperative bargaining such as Gale
1In Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980), the consumption set of agents is implic-
itly R‘ instead of the usual non-negative orthant. Although a feasible bundle is always
preferred by agents to one that gives negative quantities of some of the goods, the un-
feasibility of some bundles o⁄-the-equilibrium path allows to go around the violation of
Maskin monotonicity on the boundary of the feasible set.
2The constrained Walrasian correspondence is a supercorrespondence of the Walrasian
correspondence. Thomson (1999) shows that it is the minimal monotonic extension of the
Walrasian correspondence. For domains in which preferences are convex and Walrasian
allocations are interior, the two correspondence coincide.
2(1986, a and b), or more recently Kunimoto and Serrano (2004) provide im-
plementation in subgame perfect equilibrium of the Walrasian correspondence
for economies with a continuum of agents. However, Walrasian allocations
on the boundary of the feasible sets are also ruled out. Finally, Yildiz (2003)
considers a bargaining procedure that covers only the two-player case, and
uses assumptions such as uniqueness and interiority of Walrasian allocations.
To the best of our knowledge, the papers on non-cooperative bargaining are
the only one in this literature that use sequential mechanisms.
We know that the class of implementable SCCs considerably expands
when one considers re￿nements of Nash equilibrium as solution concepts.
For instance, in their seminal papers, Moore and Repullo (1988) (MR in
the sequel) and Abreu and Sen (1990) (henceforth AS) show that Maskin
monotonicity is no longer necessary for implementation in subgame perfect
equilibrium. In MR, it is claimed that the Walrasian Correspondence is
implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium when preferences are contin-
uous, convex, and monotonic. In contradiction with their claim, we ￿rst
show that, without further restrictions, the boundary problem generates an
impossibility. Indeed, the Walrasian correspondence de￿ned over this class
of economies is in fact not implementable in any responsive game theoretic
solution concept ￿ and therefore not implementable in any of the solution
concepts commonly studied in the literature.3
Next, we show that, by excluding non-di⁄erentiable preferences, the Wal-
rasian correspondence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium.4 We
then proceed to solve the boundary problem. Because MR and AS construct
a canonical mechanism for the entire class of SCCs that are implementable
in subgame perfect equilibrium, we could simply rely on their construction.5
Nevertheless, once a speci￿c SCC of interest has been identi￿ed, this mech-
anism is not very appealing. It involves each agent reporting preference
pro￿les, which are in￿nite-dimensional objects. Also, since this mechanism
3See section 2.2 for a formal de￿nition of a responsive game theoretic solution concept.
4Obviously, even with di⁄erentiability, the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash im-
plementable as long as boundary allocations are not excluded.
5Suppose we are interested in implementation of SCCs in subgame perfect equilib-
rium. Loosely speaking, we say that a mechanism is canonical if it is constructed for the
implementation of entire class of SCCs.
3is not designed for any particular SCC, it does not capture the speci￿c char-
acteristics of the Walrasian correspondence.
However, for Nash implementation, Saijo (1988) and McKelvey (1989)
show that the size of strategy sets in general mechanisms can be reduced. In
particular, McKelvey (1989) shows that announcements of preference pro￿les
are not necessary. While such reduction remains an open question for imple-
mentation in subgame perfect equilibrium, it is possible to follow a similar
approach for speci￿c SCCs and use tailor-made strategy sets ￿ see for in-
stance Serrano and Vohra (2002) who, in the context of exchange economies,
provide a mechanism to implement the bargaining set in subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Our position is that a mechanism is appealing if (i) in equilibrium, agents
always get what they asked for, (ii) announcements of preference pro￿les are
not part of the strategy sets of agents, and (iii) the mechanism corresponds
closely to the description of the correspondence studied.
Our mechanism is simple, appealing, and it doubly implements the Wal-
rasian correspondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equi-
librium. Importantly, our construction is based on the notion of allocations,
prices, and moves along price hyperplanes, which are central in the story be-
hind the Walrasian correspondence. Recall that a pair composed of a feasible
allocation and a price vector is a Walrasian equilibrium if each agent gets,
at that allocation, the best bundle he can obtain in his budget set: no agent
wants to ￿move￿and get a di⁄erent bundle on his budget hyperplane. This
fundamental property is problematic for allocations that are on the boundary
of the feasible set: moves along price hyperplanes can lead to bundles that are
unfeasible. The mechanism we construct allows a better understanding of the
strategic issues at stake when solving the boundary problem. Interestingly,
in contrast to implementation in Nash equilibrium, a change in the property
of a boundary allocation when going from one preference pro￿le to another
￿ from Walrasian to not being Walrasian￿is revealed through di⁄erences in
the upper contour sets at that allocation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the set-up.
In Section 3, we prove our impossibility result. In Section 4, we present the




There is a set N ￿ f1;:::;ng, n ￿ 2; of agents, and a set L ￿ f1;:::;‘g of
in￿nitely divisible goods. For each i 2 N, let R‘
+ be agent i￿ s consumption
set. For each i 2 N, let Ri be a complete and transitive binary relation on
R‘
+ indicating (weak) preferences. Let the associated strict preference and
indi⁄erence relations be Pi and Ii. For each i 2 N, let Ri be agent i￿ s set
of possible preferences. Let R =
Q
i Ri be the set of preference pro￿les. A
typical preference pro￿le is a list R = (Ri)i2N 2 R. For each i 2 N, let
!i 2 R‘
+ n f0g be i￿ s individual endowment. The aggregate endowment is
￿ ! =
P
!i ￿ 0.6 Each i 2 N is fully characterized by Ri and !i. The only
characteristics of agents unknown to the planner are the preferences. An
economy is thus a preference pro￿le.
We consider the following two domains of economies.
RC (classical domain): For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 RC
i is continuous,
convex and strongly monotonic.7
RD (di⁄erentiable domain): For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 RD
i is convex,
strongly monotonic and representable by a di⁄erentiable utility function.
A feasible allocation is a list of bundles (xi)i2N 2 R‘n
+ such that
P
xi ￿ ￿ !.
Given i 2 N, let xil 2 R+ be the l-th coordinate of xi.
Let A ￿ fx 2 R‘n
+ :
P
xi ￿ ￿ !g be the set of feasible allocations.
Let @A ￿ fx 2 A : for some i 2 N and some l;m 2 L, xil = ￿ !l, xim > 0g
be the (upper) boundary of A. Likewise, let A￿ = An@A ￿ fx 2 A : for each
i 2 N and l 2 L, either 0 ￿ xil < ￿ !l, or xil = ￿ !l implies that for each m 6= l,
xim = 0g be the interior of A.8
For each i 2 N, let Ai; @Ai, and A￿
i be the projections of A, @A and A￿
onto agent i￿ s consumption set.
6We order vectors with the usual conventions, ￿, >, ￿.
7A preference relation Ri de￿ned over R‘
+ is convex if, for each fxi;yig ￿ R‘
+ such that
xi Pi yi, we have that for each ￿ 2 (0;1], ￿xi + (1 ￿ ￿)yi Pi yi.
A preference relation Ri de￿ned over R‘
+ is strongly monotonic if, for each fxi;yig ￿ R‘
+,
xi > yi implies that xi Pi yi.
8Notice that our de￿nition of interiority is not strictly speaking the interior of A since
some corners of the Edgeworth box may be included in A￿. We nevertheless stick to this
terminology for convenience.
5For each x 2 @A, let J(x) ￿ fi 2 N : xi 2 @Aig be the set of agents who
receive a bundle xi on the boundary of the feasible set.
Let F ￿ fx 2 R‘n
+ :
P
xi = ￿ !g be the set of balanced allocations.
A price vector is p 2 R‘
+ such that
P
pl = 1. Let ￿ ￿ fp 2 R‘
+ : P
pl = 1g be the price simplex and ￿+ ￿ fp 2 R‘
++ :
P
pl = 1g the set of
strictly positive price vector.
For each i 2 N; each zi 2 Ai, and each p 2 ￿, let Bi(p;zi) ￿ ￿
xi 2 R‘
+ : p ￿ xi ￿ p ￿ zi
￿
be the budget set of agent i at price p and bun-
dle zi, and Bi(p;zi) \ Ai ￿ fxi 2 Ai : p ￿ xi ￿ p ￿ zig his constrained budget
set at price p and bundle zi.
For each x 2 @A, each p 2 ￿+ and each i 2 J(x), let Ti(p;x) ￿ fp0 2
￿+nfpg : there exists yi 2 Ainfxig such that p0￿yi = p0￿xi and p￿yi > p￿!ig
be the set of prices at which i can attain bundles yi 2 Bi(p0;xi)\Ai that are
not a⁄ordable in Bi(p;!i) \ Ai.9
For each i 2 N, each Ri 2 Ri; and each xi 2 R‘
+, let UC(Ri;xi) ￿ ￿
yi 2 R‘
+ : yi Ri xi
￿
be the upper contour set of Ri at xi; LC(Ri;xi) ￿ ￿
yi 2 R‘
+ : xi Ri yi
￿
be the lower contour set of Ri at xi; SUC(Ri;xi) ￿ ￿
yi 2 R‘
+ : yi Pi xi
￿




+ : xi Ii yi
￿
be the indi⁄erence curve of Ri through
xi.
Given R 2 R, x 2 A is a Walrasian allocation for R if there is p 2 ￿
such that for each i 2 N, xi 2 Bi(p;!i); and for each yi 2 Bi(p;!i), xi Ri yi.
For each R 2 R, let W(R) be the set of these allocations.
Likewise, Given R 2 R; (x;p) 2 A ￿ ￿ is a Walrasian equilibrium for R
if for each i 2 N, xi 2 Bi(p;!i); and for each yi 2 Bi(p;!i), xi Ri yi.10 For
each R 2 R, let WE(R) be the set of these allocation-price pairs.
A social choice correspondence is a mapping f : R ￿ A that associates
to each preference pro￿le a non-empty subset of feasible allocations.
The Walrasian correspondence W : R ￿ A associates to each economy
R 2 R its set of Walrasian allocations W(R).
To conclude, we recall the de￿nition of Maskin monotonicity and the
necessary condition C for subgame perfect implementation introduced in MR.
9This de￿nition will be explained in Section 4 and Figure 3.
10Notice that, both in RC and RD, preferences are strongly montonic. Thus, for each
Walrasian equilibrium (x;p), we have p 2 ￿+.
6Maskin monotonicity: For each fR;R0g ￿ R and each a 2 f(R),
[For each i 2 N; LC (Ri;ai) \ Ai ￿ LC(R
0
i;ai) \ Ai] =) [ a 2 f(R
0)].
Condition C: For each fR;R0g ￿ R and each a 2 f(R)nf(R0), there exists
a ￿nite sequence (al)
k+1
l=1 of elements of A such that,



















2.2 Game-form: de￿nitions and notation
Let T be a game tree. Let S be the set of nodes of T, s0 the initial node,
and Z the set of terminal nodes. For each i 2 N, let Mi be the set of (pure)
strategies, and for each s 2 S, let Ms
i be the set of strategies available to i
at node s 2 S. Let M ￿
Q
i Mi be the set of strategy pro￿les. As is common
in the implementation literature, we con￿ne our attention to pure strategies.
Let g, the outcome function, be a function that associates a feasible allocation
with each path of play. An extensive mechanism ￿ ￿ (N;T;g) ￿ or extensive
game form￿is a game with possibly simultaneous moves.11
Let m 2 M. Let g(m) be the allocation prescribed by the path induced
by m, and gi(m) the i-th component of g(m). Let g(m;s) be the allocation
corresponding to m starting at node s. Let G be the set of mechanisms.
Let ￿ 2 G. Given R 2 R, ￿ de￿nes a non-cooperative game in extensive
form (￿;R). For each R 2 R, a game-theoretic solution concept E (hence-
forth solution concept) describes a set of predictions on how ￿ will be played,
as a function of the agents￿preferences. It is a mapping E : G￿R ￿ 2M. For
each R 2 R, let E(￿;R) and EO(￿;R) be the set of E-equilibrium and E-
equilibrium outcomes of (￿;R). The de￿nition of solution concepts is indeed
very broad and encompasses many concepts in which agents do not behave
11The de￿nition we give encompasses both static and sequential mechanisms: a sta-
tic mechanism can always be represented via an extensive mechanism with simultaneous
moves.
7￿strategically￿ . In order to narrow the de￿nition, we introduce the minimal
requirement on a solution concept.
Responsiveness: E is responsive with respect to ￿ 2 G if for each fR;R0g ￿
R and each x 2 EO(￿;R) n EO(￿;R0), there exist i 2 N and fyi;zig ￿ Ai
such that,
yi Ri zi and zi P
0
i yi:
Observe that all the solution concepts commonly studied in the imple-
mentation literature ￿ such as Nash equilibrium and any of its re￿nements￿
are responsive.
We de￿ne next the solution concepts that we consider in the paper. Let
R 2 R and ￿ 2 G.
A subgame perfect equilibrium of (￿;R) is m￿ 2 M such that for each s 2





Let SPE(￿;R) and SPEO(￿;R) be the set of subgame perfect equilib-
rium and subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of (￿;R).
A strong equilibrium of (￿;R) is m￿ 2 M such that for each H ￿ N, each
m0 6= m with, for each i 2 N n H, mi = m0




A strong subgame perfect equilibrium of (￿;R) is m￿ 2 M such that for
each proper subgame, m￿ is a strong equilibrium in that subgame. Let
SSPE(￿;R) and SSPEO(￿;R) be the set of strong subgame perfect equi-
librium and strong subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of (￿;R).
A SCC f is implemented by ￿ in E if for each R 2 R, we have EO(￿;R) =
f(R):
A SCC f is doubly implemented by ￿ in subgame perfect and strong sub-
game perfect equilibrium if for each R 2 R we have, SSPEO(￿;R) =
SPEO(￿;R) = f(R).
We de￿ne next the more general notion of implementability of a SCC f.
8Implementability: There exist ￿ and a solution concept E; responsive with
respect to ￿; such that f is implemented by ￿ in E.
We need to introduce one last piece of notation. For each i 2 N, let
￿i 2 R‘
+ n f0g be such that !i ￿ ￿i 2 R‘
+ n f0g. Such an ￿i exists since
we assumed that for each i 2 N, !i > 0. Let P be the set of one-to-
one functions ￿ permutations￿from N into itself, and let Pn be the set of
permutation pro￿les. For each i 2 N, let ￿i 2 P be a permutation and
￿ ￿ (￿i)i2N. For each ￿ 2 Pn; let f(￿) ￿ ￿1(￿2(:::(￿i :::(￿n)):::) be the
ordered composition of the permutations in ￿. We call f(￿) a protocol. For
each ￿ 2 Pn, let fi(￿) be the i-th agent in f(￿) ￿ i.e. f1(￿) is the ￿rst agent,
fn(￿) the last agent in the protocol etc.
For each i 2 N and each ￿ 2 Pn, we use the notation (￿0i;￿￿i) to
indicate that i uses ￿0i; instead of ￿i, while each j 2 N n fig uses ￿j. Since
we con￿ne our attention to pure strategies, notice that, for each i 2 N
and each f￿;￿￿g ￿ Pn; there exists ￿0i 6= ￿i such that f(￿0i;￿￿i) = f(￿￿).
Permutations will be used as components of strategy sets and will play a
role similar to integer devices found in many of the mechanisms used in the
literature. However, unlike integer devices, P is a ￿nite set which allows us
to have ￿nite strategy sets in the mechanism we construct in Section 4.12
Permutations capture here an idea of anonymity of the mechanism ￿
equilibria should be independent of protocols￿and work as a ￿king-maker￿
process because protocols will determine who will lead the game if it goes
beyond Stage 1 of our mechanism. A similar device was used in Serrano and
Vohra (1997). Permutations were used ￿rst as components of strategy spaces
in the context of implementation, but in a di⁄erent fashion, in Thomson
(2005; ￿rst version dated 1995).
3 An impossibility Result
Given any responsive solution concept, implementability of a SCC requires
the following property to be satis￿ed.
Justi￿ed sensitivity: For each fR;R0g ￿ R and each a 2 f(R) n f(R0),
there exist i 2 N and fxi;yig ￿ Ai such that,
xi Ri yi and yi P
0
i xi.
12See Jackson (1992) for a criticism of integer games.
9Justi￿ed sensitivity is a basic necessary condition for a SCC to be
implemented in some responsive solution concept.13 Suppose there exist
fR;R0g ￿ R and z 2 A such that z 2 f(R) n f(R0). If f satis￿es imple-
mentability, there exist a mechanism ￿ and a solution concept E; responsive
with respect to ￿; such that f is implemented by ￿ in E. Precisely, there
exists m 2 E(￿;R) that gives g(m) = z. Assume that there does not exist
i 2 N and fxi;yig ￿ Ai such that xi Ri yi and yi P 0
i xi. Since f is imple-
mented by ￿ in E, then z = 2 EO(￿;R0). But this is in contradiction with
E being responsive. In fact, f cannot be implemented by ￿ in E: it is not
possible to check information on allocations that are not feasible.14
When the domain of preference pro￿les is RC, the Walrasian correspon-
dence violates justi￿ed sensitivity, and hence violates implementability.15 The
problem we underline here also applies to public good economies and the
Lindhal correspondence. Proposition 1 below can be adapted to that case.
Proposition 1: Suppose the domain is RC and n ￿ 2. Then the Walrasian
correspondence violates implementability.
Proof: Let ‘ = n = 2: Let R ￿ RC, R1 = fR1;R0
1g, R2 = fR2g, R =
(R1;R2), R0 = (R0
1;R0
2) with R0
2 = R2 and W : R ￿ A. Let R1, R0
1 and R2
be respectively represented by the following functions:
u1(x1;y1) = minfx1 + y1; x1 + 1
3y1 + 8
3g, u0
1(x1;y1) = x1 + y1, and
u2(x2;y2;R2) = 2x2 + y2.
The individual endowments are !1 = !2 = (2;2).
Let z￿ = ((1;4);(3;0)) and p￿ = (2
3; 1
3). Observe that z￿ 2 W(R) with
supporting price p￿. The situation is depicted in Figure 1.
13The reader may have noticed that a preference change from R to R0 could also simply
imply the existence of i 2 N and fxi;yig ￿ Ai such that xi Pi yi and yi I0
i xi. By continuity
and strong monotonicity of preferences, this implies that there exists fwi;zig ￿ Ai such
that wi Ri zi and zi P0
i wi. Therefore, whenever R 6= R0, the structure of the model
and the assumptions on preferences guarantee that, if preferences change within A, there
always exists a ￿real￿preference reversal in A.
14Therefore, when a SCC f violates justi￿ed sensitivity, the only hope to have f imple-
mented is to use some non-responsive solution concepts. For instance, let Truth be the
truthtelling solution concept ￿ i.e. agents always report truthfully￿and ￿ be the direct
mechanism in which g = f and, for each i 2 N, Mi = Ri. Trivially, for each R 2 R;
TruthO(￿;R) = f(R).
15The violation of justi￿ed sensitivity implies that the Walrasian correspondence cannot
be virtually implemented in any responsive solution concept. See Abreu and Sen (1991)
















Since z￿ = 2 W(R0), implementability requires justi￿ed sensitivity. How-
ever, there does not exist i 2 N and fxi;yig ￿ Ai such that xi Ri yi and
yi P 0
i xi. It is easy to see that the proof can be extended to any n and ‘.16
Q.E.D.
By considering the domain RD, the pathologies uncovered in Proposi-
tion 1 disappear.17 Di⁄erentiability of preferences guarantees that local in-
formation around z￿ can be used to construct a sequence (al)
k+1
l=1 of elements
of A as required by condition C. To see this, consider fR;R0g ￿ RD and
z￿ 2 W(R) n W(R0) as shown in Figure 2.
We can now identify fz￿;x;yg ￿ A such that,
z
￿
1 R1 x1 R1 y1 and y1 P
0
1 x1.




to di⁄er around z￿
1 if z￿ = 2 W(R0). Excluding non-di⁄erentiable preference
relations from the domain, we do not need further restrictions to implement
the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect equilibrium.
16It is clear that the domain R ￿ R
C of preferences does not have to be a cartesian
product for the proof to go through.
17Obviously, even with this domain restriction, the Walrasian correspondence is not



















4 Taking care of the boundary problem
We now work with the di⁄erentiable domain RD. The mechanism we con-
struct has three stages. At stage 1, agents simultaneously announce an al-
location, a price and a permutation. First, for each R 2 RD, and each
(x;p) 2 A￿￿￿+, the information contained locally in prices is enough to de-
termine whether (x;p) 2 WE(R): If (x;p) = 2 WE(R), there exist i 2 N and
yi 2 Bi(p;!i)\Ai such that yi Pi xi.18 The possibility of moves along budget
hyperplanes is an important feature of our construction.19 Accordingly, our
mechanism always stops at Stage 1 if announced allocations are in A￿.
However when x 2 @A, this device does not work anymore because moves
along price hyperplanes can lead to infeasible bundles. To circumvent this
problem, we still rely on the information contained locally in prices, but we
use an alternative idea of retrading. This is where sequentiality comes into
play. To see this, let us look at Figure 3. There is fR;R0g ￿ RD and
(z￿;p￿) 2 @A ￿ ￿+ such that (z￿;p￿) 2 WE(R) n WE(R0). Observe that (i)
z￿
1 2 @A1 and (ii) p0 is such that there exists y1 2 A1 with p0 ￿ y1 = p0 ￿ z￿
1
18The assumption of convexity of preferences cannot be relaxed. Thomson (1999)
showed that with non-convex preferences, the Walrasian correspondence violates Maskin
monotonicity even for allocations that are in A￿.

















and p￿ ￿y1 > p￿ ￿!1. Hence, 1 2 J(z￿) and p0 2 T1(p￿;z￿). When agent 1 has
preferences R1, there exists y1 2 (B1(p0;z￿
1)\A1)nB1(p;!1) such that y1 P1
z￿
1. Notice that we use a new constrained budget set B1(p0;z￿
1) \ A1 where
z￿
1 plays the role of agent 1￿ s endowment ￿ hence the idea of retrading. But
when agent 1 has preferences R0
1, there does not exist y1 2 B1(p0;z￿
1) \ A1
such that y1 P1 z￿
1. Thus (z￿;p￿) = 2 WE(R0). For if (z￿;p￿) 2 WE(R0), each
p0 2 T1(p;z￿) would create pro￿table retrading opportunities for agent 1 in
B1(p0;z￿
1) \ A1.
Whenever agents agree on an allocation x 2 @A, the game continues
to Stage 2 and agent f1(￿) is given the opportunity to reveal whether x
is Walrasian for the true preference pro￿le. The revelation is made possible
because, for each fR;R0g ￿ RD and each (x;p) 2 @A￿￿+ such that (x;p) 2
WE(R) n WE(R0), there exist i 2 J(x) and p0 6= p such that SUC(Ri;xi) \
fyi 2 Ai : p0 ￿yi = p0 ￿xig 6= ; while UC(R0
i;xi)\fyi 2 Ai : p0 ￿yi = p0 ￿xig =
;. Interestingly, in contrast to implementation in Nash equilibrium, for the
boundary problem, a change in the property of an allocation x 2 @A when
going from one preference pro￿le R to another R0 ￿ from being Walrasian to
not being Walrasian￿is revealed through di⁄erences in the upper contour
sets at that allocation.
We now present formally our mechanism. It is de￿ned for n ￿ 3 agents.
13For each i 2 N; select an ￿i 2 R‘
+ n f0g such that !i ￿ ￿i 2 R‘
+ n f0g.20
Mechanism ￿:
Stage 1: Agents simultaneously choose (m1
i)n
i=1 with m1
i = (xi;pi;￿i) 2
F ￿ ￿+ ￿ P such that, for each i 2 N and each j 6= i, pi ￿ xi
j = pi ￿ !j.
1) If for each i 2 N, (xi;pi) = (￿ x; ￿ p) and ￿ x 2 A￿, the game stops and the
outcome is ￿ x.
2) If for each i 2 N, (xi;pi) = (￿ x; ￿ p) and ￿ x 2 @A, then go to Stage 2.
3) If for each j 2 N n fig, (xj;pj) = (￿ x; ￿ p), i 6= fn(￿), and mi = (x0;p0) 6=
(￿ x; ￿ p), then (i) if ￿ p ￿ x0
i = ￿ p ￿ !i, agent i gets x0
i, each j 2 N n fi;fn(￿)g gets
￿ !￿x0
i
n￿2 , and fn(￿) gets the 0 bundle, or (ii) if ￿ p ￿ x0
i 6= ￿ p ￿ !i, then each j 2 N
gets his endowment !j.
4) In all other cases, the game stops, f1(￿) gets !f1(￿) + ￿fn(￿), each
j 2 N n ff1(￿);fn (￿)g gets !j, and fn(￿) gets !fn(￿) ￿ ￿fn(￿):
Stage 2: Agent f1(￿) chooses m2
f1(￿) = (k;p0) 2 N n ff1(￿)g ￿ ￿+.
1) if ￿ xk 2 @Ak and p0 2 Tk(￿ p; ￿ x), go to Stage 3.21
2) In all other cases, the game stops and the outcome is ￿ x.
Stage 3: Agent k chooses m3
k = yk 2 fy0
k 2 Ak : p0 ￿ y0
k = p0 ￿ ￿ xk, ￿ p ￿ yk >
￿ p ￿ !kg [ f￿ xkg.
1) If he chooses yk = ￿ xk, he gets it and agent f1(￿) gets ￿ xf1(￿) + 1
n￿2(￿ ! ￿
￿ xk ￿ ￿ xf1(￿)). If k 2 N n ffn(￿)g, then each j 2 N n ff1(￿);k;fn(￿)g gets
1
n￿2(￿ ! ￿ ￿ xk ￿ ￿ xf1(￿)), and fn(￿) gets the 0 bundle. Otherwise, if k = fn(￿),
then each j 2 N n ff1(￿);k;fn￿1(￿)g gets 1
n￿2(￿ ! ￿ ￿ xk ￿ ￿ xf1(￿)) and agent
fn￿1(￿) gets the 0 bundle.
2) If he chooses yk 6= ￿ xk, he gets it. Agent f1(￿) gets the 0 bundle and
each j 2 N n ff1(￿);kg gets
￿ !￿yk
n￿2 .
We can now proceed to the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1: Suppose the domain is RD and that n ￿ 3. Then, the Wal-
rasian correspondence is doubly implemented by ￿ in subgame perfect and
strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
20Individual epsilons are parameters of this mechanism.
21That is, p0 2 ￿+ is such that there exist feasible bundles yk 6= ￿ xk, with ￿ p ￿ yk = ￿ p ￿ !k
and p0 ￿ yk < p0 ￿ ￿ xk
14Proof: Let R 2 RD. The proof is divided into two parts.
First part: SPEO(￿;R) ￿ W(R).22
Let m 2 SPE(￿;R) with m1
i = (xi;pi;￿i). We show that g(m) 2 W(R).
The proof is divided in several lemma.
Lemma 1: There exists (￿ x; ￿ p) such that, for each i 2 N, (xi;pi) = (￿ x; ￿ p)
Proof : The proof is by contradiction. There are two cases.
Case 1: There exist (￿ x; ￿ p) 2 A ￿ ￿+ and i 2 N n ffn(￿)g such that for each
j 6= i, (xj;pj) = (￿ x; ￿ p), and (xi;pi) 6= (￿ x; ￿ p).
First, if ￿ p￿x0
i = ￿ p￿!i, the game stops and gfn(￿)(m) = 0. Let k ￿ fn(￿). Let
m01
k = (x0k;p0k;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿￿k), and (x0k;p0k) 6= (￿ x; ￿ p). Then
gk(m0
k;m￿k) = !k + ￿fn(￿0k;￿￿k): Since preferences are strongly monotonic,
!k > 0, and for each j 2 N, ￿j > 0, this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k.
Thus, m = 2 SPE(￿;R).
Next, if ￿ p ￿ x0
i 6= ￿ p ￿ !i, the game stops and each j 2 N gets gj(m) = !j.
Let k 2 N n fig. Let m01
k = (x0k;p0k;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿￿k); and
(x0k;p0k) 6= (￿ x; ￿ p). Then gk(m0
k;m￿k) = !k+￿fn(￿0k;￿￿k): Since preferences are
strongly monotonic, !k > 0; and for each j 2 N, ￿j > 0; this is a pro￿table
deviation for agent k. Thus m = 2 SPE(￿;R).
Case 2: Either (i) There exist (￿ x; ￿ p) 2 A ￿ ￿+ and k ￿ fn(￿) such that for
each j 2 N n ffn(￿)g, (xj;pj) = (￿ x; ￿ p), and (xk;pk) 6= (￿ x; ￿ p); or (ii) There




In either case, the game stops, each j 2 N n ff1(￿);fn(￿)g gets gj(m) =
!j, and gfn(￿)(m) = !fn(￿) ￿ ￿fn(￿). Let k 2 N n ff1(￿);fn(￿)g. Let m01
k =
(xk;pk;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿￿k) and fn(￿0k;￿￿k) = fn(￿). Then
gk(m0
k;m￿k) = !k + ￿fn(￿0k;￿￿k). Since preferences are strongly monotonic,
!k > 0, and for each j 2 N, ￿j > 0; this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k.
Thus, m = 2 SPE(￿;R). ￿
Lemma 2: Let ￿ x 2 A￿. Then (￿ x; ￿ p) 2 WE(R)
Proof : Suppose not. The game stops at Stage 1 with g(m) = ￿ x 2 A￿ but
(￿ x; ￿ p) = 2 WE(R).
By de￿nition of a Walrasian equilibrium, convexity of preferences and the
fact that ￿ x 2 A￿, there exist k 2 N and x0
k 2 Ak such that ￿ p￿x0
k = ￿ p￿!k and
x0
k Pk ￿ xk. Let m01
k = (x0; ￿ p;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿￿k), and for each j 2
22Since SSPE(￿;R) ￿ SPE(￿;R); it is enough, for the ￿rst part of the proof, to show





n￿1 . Then gk(m0
k;m￿k) = x0
k. Since x0
k Pk ￿ xk by construction,
this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SPE(￿;R). ￿
Lemma 3: Let ￿ x 2 @A. Then the game stops at Stage 2 with ￿ x as outcome
Proof : Suppose not. There exist i 2 N and l;m 2 L such that ￿ xil = ￿ !l,
￿ xim > 0, and the game goes beyond Stage 2.
Given the rules of the game, there is k 2 ff1(￿);fn(￿);fn￿1(￿)g who
gets gk(m) = 0. Let m01
k = (￿ x; ￿ p;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿￿k) and
m02
k = (f2(￿0k;￿￿k); ￿ p). The game stops with g(m0
k;m￿k) = ￿ x as outcome.
Remember that for each j 2 N, ￿ xj > 0 since !j > 0, ￿ p ￿ ￿ xj = ￿ p ￿ !j and
￿ p 2 ￿+. Hence, by deviating, agent k gets ￿ xk > 0. By strong monotonicity of
preferences, this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2 SPE(￿;R).
￿
Lemma 4: Let ￿ x 2 @A. Then (￿ x; ￿ p) 2 WE(R)
Proof : Suppose not. The game stops at stage 2 with g(m) = ￿ x 2 @A but
(￿ x; ￿ p) = 2 WE(R). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: g(m) = ￿ x but there exists i 2 N for whom,
(Bi(￿ p;!i) \ Ai) \ SUC(Ri; ￿ xi) 6= ;.
Let k ￿ i. Let m01
k = (x0; ￿ p;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿k), x0
k 2
(Bk(￿ p;!k) \ Ak) \ SUC(Rk; ￿ xk); ￿ p ￿ x0









￿ xk by construction, this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k. Thus, m = 2
SPE(￿;R).
Case 2: g(m) = ￿ x but there exists i 2 N for whom,
Bi(￿ p;!i) \ SUC(Ri; ￿ xi) 6= ;.
Since Case 1 is ruled out, we have that if x0
i 2 Bi(￿ p;!i) \ SUC(Ri; ￿ xi),
then for some l 2 L, x0
il > ￿ !l. Note that ￿ xi 2 @Ai. Let k 2 N n fig.
Let m01
k = (￿ x; ￿ p;￿0k) be such that k = f1(￿0k;￿k); and m02
k = (fj(￿);p0) be
such that i = fj(￿), p0 2 Ti(￿ p; ￿ x); and (Bi(p0; ￿ xi) \ Ai) \ UC(Ri; ￿ xi) = f￿ xig.
By construction, the unique best response of i at Stage 3 is ￿ xi. Hence,
gk(m0
k;m￿k) = ￿ xk + 1
n￿2(￿ ! ￿ ￿ xi ￿ ￿ xk). Since for each j 2 N, ￿ xj > 0, and
preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a pro￿table deviation for agent k.
Thus, m = 2 SPE(￿;R). ￿
16Second part: W(R) ￿ SSPEO(￿;R).
Let (x;p) 2 WE(R). Then the following pro￿le of strategy supports x as
SSPE outcome of (￿;R).
(i) At Stage 1, each i 2 N announces m1
i = (x;p;￿I), where ￿I is the
identity permutation.
Let (￿ x; ￿ p) be the unanimously agreed price-allocation pair. Let C ￿ fi 2
J(￿ x)nff1(￿)g : (a) (Bi(￿ p;!i)\Ai)\SUC(Ri; ￿ xi) = ;; and (b) there is x0
i 2
Bi(￿ p;!i) \ SUC(Ri; ￿ xi) with x0
il > ￿ !l for some l 2 Lg.
(ii) At Stage 2, agent f1 (￿) makes the following announcement:
Case 1: C 6= ;
If jCj = 1; m2
f1(￿) = (k;p0) 2 C ￿ Tk(￿ p; ￿ x) such that (Bk(p0; ￿ xk) \ Ak) \
UC(Rk; ￿ xk) = f￿ xkg and (Bk(p0; ￿ xk) \ Ak) \ SUC(Rk; ￿ xk) = ;.
If jCj > 1, m2
f1(￿) = (k;p0) 2 C ￿ Tk(￿ p; ￿ x) such that for each j 2 C n fkg;
￿ xk ￿ ￿ xj; (Bk(p0; ￿ xk) \ Ak) \ UCk(Rk; ￿ xk) = f￿ xkg, and (Bk(p0; ￿ xk) \ Ak) \
SUCk(Rk; ￿ xk) = ;.23
Case 2: C = ;
Then, m2
f1(￿) = (f2(￿); ￿ p).
(iii) Following the choice of agent k by f1 (￿) and the announcement of
p, at Stage 3, then m3
k = yk such that,
￿
yk 6= ￿ xk if there exists yk 2 fy0
k 2 Ak : yk Pk ￿ xk; p0 ￿ yk = p0 ￿ ￿ xk, ￿ p ￿ yk > ￿ p ￿ !kg,
yk = ￿ xk otherwise.
It is clear that agent k is playing a best response at Stage 3. Agent
k chooses the bundle he prefers between ￿ xk and every possible yk on the
budget hyperplane of Bk(p0; ￿ xk): In case of indi⁄erence, he favors agent f1(￿)
and chooses ￿ xk.24 Given (￿ x; ￿ p) agreed upon at Stage 1 and the protocol f(￿),
notice that f1(￿) is also playing a best response at Stage 2. He announces p0 6=
￿ p only if there exists k 2 Nnff1(￿)g for whom ￿ xfk(￿) 2 @Ak, (Bk(￿ p;!k)\Ak)\
UCk(Rk; ￿ xk) = f￿ xkg; and such that there is x0
k 2 Bk(￿ p;!k) \ SUCk(Rk; ￿ xk)
23Since the outcome that f1 (￿) gets at stage 3 can depend on the bundle that k gets,
the optimal choice for f1 (￿) is to choose k 2 C who is awarded the smallest bundle at ￿ x.
24This situation could happen o⁄ the equilibrium path.
17and l 2 L with x0
kl > ￿ !l. By doing so, agent f1(￿) obtains ￿ xf1(￿) + 1
n￿2(￿ ! ￿
￿ xk ￿ ￿ xf1(￿)) > ￿ xf1(￿). Whenever this condition is not satis￿ed, one of the
best response of f1(￿) is to announce p0 = ￿ p and to choose f2 (￿). Moreover,
observe that a joint deviation by f1(￿) and k cannot make both agents better
o⁄ at Stage 3.
Finally, recall that for each Walrasian equilibrium (x;p), allocation x is
individually rational, e¢ cient, and such that for each i 2 N, Bi(p;!i) \
SUCi(Ri;xi) = ;. Thus, each deviation by a coalition H ￿ N results in
the same outcome ￿ for instance if agents modify the permutation they each
announce￿ or in an outcome at which not all members of H are strictly
better-o⁄ than at the Walrasian allocation. Therefore, the pro￿le of strate-
gies described is a strong subgame perfect equilibrium of (￿;R).
Hence, on the equilibrium path, each i 2 N announces (xi;pi) = (x;p) 2
WE(R). If x 2 A￿, the game stops at Stage 1 and g(m) = x. Otherwise, it
goes to Stage 2 where m2
f1(￿) = (f2(￿);p). The game stops at Stage 2 and
g(m) = x.
Q.E.D.
Remark 1 In the previous section, we underlined that the issue raised in
Proposition 1 applies to the Lindhal correspondence. The mechanism we
use here can be adapted to the public goods case to implement the Lindhal
correspondence.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that, without di⁄erentiability of preferences, the Walrasian
correspondence is not implementable in any of the game theoretical solution
concepts commonly considered in the implementation literature. The bound-
ary problem generates an impossibility result. Imposing di⁄erentiability of
preferences, we constructed a mechanism that takes care of the boundary
problem and doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame
perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. Our mechanism is based on
price-allocation announcements and corresponds closely to the description
of Walrasian equilibrium: moves along price hyperplanes are at the heart
of the Walrasian equilibrium concept. The mechanism allows for a better
understanding of the strategic issues attached to the boundary problem.
18Finally, our mechanism can be extended to incomplete information set-
tings by incorporating announcements of types at Stage 1 as well as state-
contingent prices and allocations. An interesting issue would be to analyze
the information transmission that occurs across stages and to characterize
an extension of the Walrasian correspondence to incomplete information set-
tings. Bochet (2006) follows a similar approach using a static mechanism. He
￿nds ambiguous connections between Walrasian and Rational Expectations
equilibria.
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